No, I’m not saying they are going to be static in an environment, but what I’m saying is there’s a couple of things. One is, I was responding to your question about when a deal rolls offs, what does life look like when your trying to invest into a new deal? The second question you were just getting at there is, what is the resilience of these vehicles to withstand credit losses and there is a significant resilience, because you don’t have financial covenance in a CLO, in a securitization structure you would have with say bank financing, another type of leverage. Securitization debt is arguably the best type of debt you can have, because its matchbook funding. These are self-healing vehicles, where even if you took an over collateralization test, it just goes to purchase new assets. Our volatility is also your friends running a CLO. The more volatility you have in loan prices, its means your fleet of deals can go and buy assts at a discount to par, return par and then all of that accrues to your benefit. CBC Apatos 8 (ph) is a great example, which is a deal we call a year ago in cash or the north of 32% IRR. When we printed that deal a couple of years prior, it was I think during one of the European mini flash crashes. Spreads had widened. Your liability costs were actually much higher than they are today, but they are booked very well and because we were able to buy assets at a steep discount, the deal benefited substantially from a pull to par strategy of those loans then trading back to par. So with the CLO there’s really two primary risks to keep in mind. One is loss risk and one is reinvestment risk. On the loss risk front, we protested against that risk by number one, doing primary issuance where we underwrite a collateral in conjunction with our management teams. Number two, we’re in the majority seat, so we can throw our weight around for the deal and what collateral shows up there. Number three, we work with only the best management teams, who have the best track records on the reinvest to protect against our losses. Number four, we insist upon only printing deals with a very strong-modeled arm, with a high ability to withstand losses. We’ve modeled out with our deals that the default rate to jump to as high as 8% to 10% per annum and run at those high unprecedented levels every single year for the life of the deal and we still wouldn’t loose money. That’s what I call a resilient structure. The second risk is reinvestment risk, where times get too good and spreads diminish as loans repay and prepay and we manage that risk by being in a majority seat, and we can call the deal whenever spreads start to diminish and your spread should decline. You do not get that right if you are just a bid player in the deal, if you only own 10%, 20%, 30%. You only have that right sitting in the majority seat, which has been our disciplined distinct strategy. For many years now that’s worked out quite well.